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Abstract
We empirically implement a dynamic structural model of labor supply and welfare program
participation for agents with potentially time-inconsistent preferences. Using panel data on the
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of time-inconsistency, and of its inﬂuence on the welfare take-up decision. With these estimates,
we conduct counterfactual experiments to quantify the utility loss stemming from the inability
to commit to future decisions, and the potential utility gains from commitment mechanisms
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Economists studying choice over time typically assume decision makers are impatient and,
traditionally, this impatience is modelled in a very particular way: agents discount future streams of
utility or proﬁts exponentially over time. Strotz (1956, p. 172) showed that exponential discounting
is not just an analytically convenient assumption; in fact, without this assumption, intertemporal
marginal rates of substitution will change as time passes, and preferences will be time-inconsistent.
A recent growing literature has built on the work of Strotz (1956) and others to explore the
consequences of relaxing the standard assumption of time-consistent discounting. Drawing both
on experimental research in psychology and on common intuition, economists have built models
of quasi-hyperbolic discounting to capture the tendency of decision makers to seize short term
rewards at the expense of long-term preferences.1 With quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the relative
value of utility received in period t versus period t + 1 increases as period t draws nearer to the
present. Thus agents have a bias towards near-term utility and immediate gratiﬁcation. As a result,
intrapersonal conﬂicts arise when earlier “selves” prefer a future sequence of trade-oﬀst h a tt h e i r
later selves will not ﬁnd optimal and therefore will not make. Moreover, to the extent that they
recognize this intrapersonal conﬂict, earlier selves have an incentive to commit their future selves to
a preferred sequence of actions. Therefore time-inconsistent preferences may generate an incentive
to exercise self-control that is absent from the standard framework.2 The literature includes studies
of the implications of self-control incentives for a variety of economic problems.3 In some of these
applications, researchers have used time-inconsistent preferences to parsimoniously explain a set of
apparently common but irrational behaviors, and explore when and why agents might beneﬁtf r o m
“commitment devices.”
This paper is an empirical investigation of the inﬂuence of time-inconsistent preferences on work
1A body of experimental research, reviewed in Ainslie (1992) and several papers in Loewenstein and Elster (1992),
indicates that hyperbolic time discounting may parsimoniously explain some basic features of the intertemporal
decision making of both animal and human subjects that are inconsistent with exponential discounting. In the
experiments using human subjects, standard decision models with exponential discounting are diﬃcult to reconcile
with commonly observed preference reversals: subjects choose the larger and later of two prizes when both are distant
in time, but prefer the smaller but earlier one as both prizes draw nearer to the present (see Rubinstein 2003, however,
for an alternative explanation of preference reversals).
2For thorough presentations of economic problems of self control, see Thaler (1991), Ainslie (1992) and O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999b), among others.
3For example, models of time-inconsistent preferences have been applied by Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999a,b) to consumption and savings; by Barro (1999) to growth; by Gruber and Koszegi (2001) to smoking
decisions; by Krusell, Kuru¸ s¸ cu, and Smith (2002) to optimal tax policy; by Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) to belief
formation; by Della Vigna and Paserman (2001) to job search.
1and welfare program participation decisions. Using panel data on the choices of single women with
dependent children, we estimate a dynamic structural model of labor supply and welfare program
participation that allows, but does not assume, time-inconsistent preferences. Our estimates, which
also allow for a correlation between observable initial conditions and unobserved heterogeneity in
skills and tastes, provide evidence of time-inconsistency in preferences. With reasonable precision,
we estimate a present-bias factor considerably less than one, and reject a standard exponential
discounting model at common conﬁdence levels.
While the literature has used stylized models to demonstrate the potentially large behav-
ioral eﬀe c t so ft i m e - i n c o n s i s t e n c yi np r e f e r e n c e s ,w ee m p h a s i z et h a tw h e t h e ra ne s t i m a t eo ft i m e -
inconsistency in preferences necessarily implies economically important behavioral consequences is
inherently an empirical question. To illustrate this point, consider the extreme case in which agents’
choices among discrete options are made very far from the margin;4 then their choices are unlikely
to change even when they are able to commit their future selves’ behavior. Indeed, simulations
of our estimated model indicate that, among women with very low human capital living in States
with relatively high welfare beneﬁts, self-control problems due to present-biased time preferences
have relatively little impact on choices over work versus welfare (see Table 8). Among this group,
commitment ability is predicted to generate more rather than less welfare participation, as these
women no longer delay their entry onto the welfare rolls out of fear of welfare stigma. Thus, the
model suggests that low-human capital women in high-beneﬁt States participate in welfare simply
because the return to welfare is quite high relative to that from low-wage work, and not because
they cannot overcome self-control problems. In contrast, for women with more education residing
in States with relatively low welfare beneﬁts, simulations of the model indicate that self-control
problems lead to substantial under-investment in human capital with respect to long-term prefer-
ences; that is, the model predicts that if they could commit themselves to future decisions, they
would choose to work considerably more often.
We also emphasize that, even when the ability to commit may dramatically alter agents’ behavior
it does not necessarily imply large utility gains. To illustrate this point, consider another extreme
case in which agents’ choices are made very close to the margin; then their choices are likely to
change when they can commit their future selves’ behavior. But such changes in choices will have
little utility consequence since they were initially close to the margin. Indeed, in our simulations we
ﬁnd that, even in low beneﬁt States where agents’ participation in work is increased substantially
by the ability to commit, the utility gains are relatively modest. Our simulations also indicate that,
4That is, if an agent chooses alternative A over B, her utility from A is much larger than that from B;a n dv i c e
versa.
2while the changes in behavior resulting from imperfect commitment policies such as welfare time
limits and workfare can be large, the expected utility of the welfare eligible is invariably reduced by
these restrictions, though for some only slightly. Only when workfare generates meaningful human
capital, and compensates lost home production through, for example, child care subsidies, does the
model predict both meaningful gains in employment and expected utility (see Tables 9 and 10).
This paper makes two contributions to the literature on time-inconsistent preferences. First,
by applying a model that allows quasi-hyperbolic preferences to the problem of labor supply and
welfare program participation, we provide an economically signiﬁcant setting for an evaluation of
the importance of time-inconsistency. As a source of information about time-inconsistency, this
context has the advantage that labor supply decisions are among the most consequential economic
choices that individuals make; they largely deﬁne time use for working-age adults. One might
expect, therefore, that choices about labor supply would be less subject to prolonged lapses in strict
intertemporal rationality. Nevertheless, recent welfare reforms and anecdotal evidence indicate a
commonly held view: the trade-oﬀ between the short-term costs of entering the labor force at
a low wage relative to the welfare beneﬁt, and the long term reward of higher wages from the
accumulation of work experience, may generate problems of self-control. Our previous research has
shown that this trade-oﬀ can, in theory, produce important observable diﬀerences in the behavior
of time-consistent and time-inconsistent agents (Fang and Silverman, 2004a). Second, economists
have so far calibrated models of time-inconsistent preferences to match important moments of
aggregate data sets (for example, Laibson et al. 1998). In this paper, we take a diﬀerent method
to estimate the structural parameters of the model, including the present-bias parameter, from a
single panel data set.5 Two recent papers also used ﬁeld data to structurally estimate discount
factors. Paserman (2003) estimates a structural job search model using data on unemployment
spells and accepted wages from the NLSY. Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2004) estimate a
structural model of consumption and saving. They calibrate some of their model parameters and
estimate the discount factors using the method of simulated moments.
This paper is also related to a small literature on labor supply and welfare participation that
structurally implements models of dynamic decision-making. Miller and Sanders (1997) estimates a
dynamic discrete choice model in which women decide monthly whether to work or receive welfare.
In an eﬀort to explain both the low welfare take-up rate among eligible families and the persistence
of welfare choices among the families who do enroll, Miller and Sanders incorporate wage growth
5Some researchers have tested the reduced form implications of hyperbolic discounting. For example, Della Vigna
and Paserman (2001) consider the inﬂuence of self control problems on job search; and Della Vigna and Malmandier
(2002) ﬁnd evidence supporting time-inconsistent preferences in data on health club contracts and usage.
3through work experience, and preferences that adapt both to labor supply and to welfare experience.
As in our paper, fertility and marriage are exogenous. Swann (1996) adds marriage to the choice
set, and looks at women’s decisions annually. In a working paper, Keane and Wolpin (2000)
endogenize education, employment, fertility and marriage decisions. Each of these prior papers
assumes exponential discounting preferences. Our paper contributes to this literature and to the
welfare reform debate with, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst empirical examination of the importance of
time-inconsistency for the welfare take-up decision. We are also able to use the structural estimates
of the model to calculate the value of commitment to potential welfare recipients and predict the
behavioral response and utility consequences of welfare reform measures such as time limits and
work requirement, thus quantifying the inﬂuence of time-inconsistency.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents our model and describes
the intrapersonal game played by the decision maker and describes the numerical method for
obtaining the game’s solution. Section 3 presents the estimation strategy and discusses identiﬁcation
issues. Section 4 describes the data and variable deﬁnitions. Section 5 presents the estimation
results and associated simulations. Section 6 provides estimates of both the behavioral consequences
and utility value of an ability to commit, and of various policy changes such as time limits and
workfare. Section 7 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
We consider a discrete time model of work-welfare decisions by a single parent (interchangeably,
an agent). Each agent has a ﬁnite decision horizon starting from her age at the birth of her ﬁrst
child, a0, and ending at age A.6 At each age a ∈ {a0,...,A}, the agent must choose from a choice
set D that includes three mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives: receive welfare, work in
the labor market, or stay at home without work or welfare. The alternatives of welfare, work and
home are respectively referred to as alternative 0,1a n d2 , thus D = {0,1,2}.7 The agent’s decision
in period a is denoted by da ∈ D.
The return from choosing alternative d for an agent at age a represents all of the current-period
beneﬁts and costs associated with the choice and it is denoted by Ra (d;sa,² da)w h e r esa is a set of
payoﬀ-relevant state variables at age a to be detailed below and ²da is a random shock to the value
6Agents will obtain a continuation value in the terminal period A as a function of her payoﬀ-relevant state variables.
7In reality, it is possible that an agent chooses more than one actions in any period, and there are also distinctions
between part- and full-time work. For example, Edin and Lein (1997) report that, in their study of 379 low-income
single mothers, many welfare recipients both work in the (unoﬃcial) labor market and rely on family and neighborhood
resources.
4of alternative d at age a. We parameterize Ra (d;sa,² da) as follows.
Welfare. An agent’s age-a return to welfare Ra (0;sa,² 0a) depends on her State of residence j;
t h en u m b e ro fh e rc h i l d r e ni np e r i o da, denoted by na; her age-(a − 1) choice da−1. In the absence
of a time limit, Ra (0;sa,² 0a)i ss p e c i ﬁed as follows:8
Ra (0;sa,² 0a)=e(na)+Gj (na) − φ(da−1)+²0a, (1)
where e(na) is the monetary value of her home production skills or leisure as a function of the
number of her children; Gj (na) is the monetary value of the cash and food welfare beneﬁts in State
j as a function of the number of her children; φ(da−1) is the net stigma associated with welfare
participation denominated in dollars; and ²0a is an idiosyncratic, choice-speciﬁcs h o c k .
The value of home production skills (leisure) is allowed to depend on the number of children
to capture the additional demands or rewards of having more children. We assume a quadratic
function for e(na):
e(na)=e0 + e1na + e2n2
a. (2)
The welfare beneﬁts schedule Gj (na)i sa s s u m e dt ob ea na ﬃne function of the number of the
agent’s children:9,10
Gj (na)=θj0 + θj1na. (3)
The welfare beneﬁts c h e d u l eGj (na) is estimated separately for each State. Finally, the net welfare





0, if da−1 =0
φ, otherwise.
(4)
In words, we assume stigma lasts for only one period after switching into welfare from some other
choice.11 The speciﬁcation of welfare stigma in (4) is most natural if we interpret the stigma
as the psychic and administrative costs associated with welfare take-up. If we take a more gen-
eral interpretation of stigma, then (4) imposes a particular form of stigma decay with continued
participation.
8To decrease the dimension of the state variables in our empirical estimation, we select samples of women who
have children below age 18, thus are eligible for welfare, during all periods that we analyze.
9The actual welfare beneﬁts schedule deviates from a linear function approximation by a few dollars at most.
However, we abstract from asset and income restriction on welfare eligiblity.
10We assume residential location at age a0 is given exogenously and remains unchanged through age A. Indeed,
85% of the sample described below continued to reside in the State in which they lived at the birth of their ﬁrst child.
11The net stigma parameter φ(da−1)h a s ,s i n c eM o ﬃtt (1983), become standard in empirical studies of welfare
participation. Its primary function is to help explain the number of welfare-eligible adults who remain at home
without work or welfare.
5In the presence of welfare time limits, it will be necessary to keep track of the cumulative
number of periods an agent has received welfare prior to age a. This is denoted by κa.G i v e n a





e(na)+Gj (na) − φ(da−1)+²0a, if κa <L ;
−∞, otherwise.
Work. An agent’s age-a return from work Ra(1;sa,² 1a) is her wage. Following the standard
theory of human capital, we model this wage as the product of a (constant) rental price of human
capital, r, and the quantity of skill units held by the individual ha (sa,² 1a):
Ra(1;sa,² 1a)=rha (sa,² 1a).
An agent’s age-a quantity of skill units when the state variable is sa,h a (sa,² 1a), is given by
ha (sa,² 1a)=e x p
£
h0 + α1g0 + α2xa + α3x2
a + α4I(xa > 0) + α5I(da−1 6=1 )+²1a
¤
, (5)
where h0 is the agent’s (unobserved) skill endowment at the birth of her ﬁrst child; g0 is her
completed years of schooling at the birth of her ﬁrst child;12 xa is her total work experience prior to
age-a;a n dda−1 is her choice in the previous period; and ²1a is the age-a skill shock. In speciﬁcation
(5), I(·) is an indicator function equal to one if the expression in parentheses is true. Thus
α4I(xa > 0) takes value α4 if the agent acquired any experience before age a, captures a persistent
ﬁrst-year experience eﬀect. The term α5I(da−1 6=1 )t a k e sv a l u eα5 (which is presumably negative)
whenever the agent was not working in the previous period. Thus the parameter α5 represents
the one-time depreciation of human capital that occurs whenever the agent leaves work to choose
welfare or home. Note that the functional form (5) implies that only (lnr + h0), but not lnr and
h0 separately, can be identiﬁed.
Home. An agent’s current-period return from staying home without work or welfare Ra (2;sa,² 2a)
is speciﬁed as follows:
Ra (2;sa,² 2a)=e(na)+ηI(da−1 =2 )+²2a
where e(na) is the same monetary value of home production as in (2); η captures the possible decay
or appreciation of the value of home production when a woman stays home without welfare; and
²2a is a choice-speciﬁcs h o c k .
12We assume the agent’s level of schooling remains unchanged after the birth of her ﬁrst child, thus do not model
the schooling choice. In fact, 34% of our sample goes on to acquire additional schooling after the birth of their ﬁrst
child. Of this fraction, approximately half acquires less than one additional year of schooling.
6We assume that the choice-speciﬁcs h o c k s²a =( ²0a,² 1a,² 2a) are distributed according to a
joint normal distribution N(0,Ω), and they are serially uncorrelated. Now we describe the payoﬀ-
relevant state variables sa in greater detail.
We analyze a single woman’s work/welfare/home decisions from the age when she was ﬁrst
surveyed in the NLSY or when she gave birth to her ﬁrst child, whichever occurred later. When an
agent ﬁrst enters our analysis at age a0, we observe a set of initial conditions, including her State
of residence j, her years of completed schooling g0, her prior work experience x0, and her decision
in the period prior to the birth of her ﬁrst child da0−1. As we mentioned earlier, we assume that
an agent’s State of residence remains unchanged during the course of the data, and she does not
further attend school. Thus (j,g0)a r et h ea g e n t ’ sp a y o ﬀ-relevant state variables that are constant
over time. We do not model the process that generated these diﬀerences in initial conditions among
agents; instead we assume that the diﬀerences in initial conditions are captured by some persistent,
unobservable heterogeneity. We describe in Section 3 below how our methodology allows for such
unobservable heterogeneity that may be correlated with observable initial conditions.13
An agent’s period-a speciﬁc state variables include her prior work experience xa, the number
of her children na, t h en u m b e ro fp r i o rp e r i o d ss h eh a dp a r t i c i p a t e di nw e l f a r eκa, and her last
period decision da−1 ∈ D. Thus (xa,n a,κa,d a−1) represents the potentially time-varying period-a
state variables. To summarize, an agent’s period-a state variables sa =( j,g0,x a,n a,κa,d a−1), and
w ew r i t et h es p a c ef o rt h es t a t ev a r i a b l e sa tp e r i o da as Sa. The evolution of the state variables are
straightforward except for na, the number of children. We treat the arrival of additional children





na + 1, with probability ρ(a,na,d a)
na, with probability 1 − ρ(a,na,d a),
where ρ(a,na,d a) is a logistic function:
ρ(a,na,d a)=
exp[γ0 + γ1a + γ2na + γ3I(da =0 )+γ4I(da =1 ) ]
1+e x p[ γ0 + γ1a + γ2na + γ3I(da =0 )+γ4I(da =1 ) ]
. (6)
Preferences. We now describe an agent’s intertemporal preferences. We assume that an agent
consumes all of the returns associated with her choice d in each period, and obtains an instantaneous
utility ua = Ra(d;sa,² da). An agent in period a is concerned about both her present and future
instantaneous utilities. Let Ua(ua,u a+1,...,uA) represent an agent’s intertemporal preferences from
the perspective of period a. We adopt a simple and now commonly used formulation of agents’
13We allow for unobservable heterogeneity in labor market skill endowment h0; home production skill endowment
e0; non-welfare home production decay η;a n dw e l f a r es t i g m aφ.
7potentially time-inconsistent preferences: (β,δ)-preferences (Phelps and Pollak 1968, Laibson 1997
and O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999a):
Deﬁnition 1. (β,δ)-preferences are intertemporal preferences represented by




where β ∈ (0,1],δ ∈ (0,1], and a ∈ {a0,a 0 +1 ,...,A}.
Following the terminology of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a), the parameter δ is called the
standard discount factor and it represents the long-run, time-consistent discounting; and the pa-
rameter β is called the present-bias factor and it represents short-term impatience. The standard
exponential discounting model is nested as a special case of (β,δ)-preference when β =1 . When
β ∈ (0,1), (β,δ)-preferences are “quasi-hyperbolic” discounting preferences in the terminology of
Laibson (1997). We say that an agent’s preference is time-consistent if β =1 , and is present-biased
if β ∈ (0,1).
Following previous studies of time-inconsistent preferences, we will analyze the behavior of
an agent by thinking of the single individual as consisting of many autonomous selves, one for
each period. Each period-a self chooses her current behavior to maximize her current preference
Ua (ua,...,u A), while her future selves control her subsequent decisions. The literature on time-
inconsistent preferences distinguishes between naive and sophisticated agents (Strotz 1956, Pollak
1968, O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999a, b). An agent is partially naive i ft h es e l fi ne v e r yp e r i o da
underestimates the present-bias of her future selves, believing that her future selves’ present bias is
˜ β ∈ (β,1); in the extreme, if the present self believes that her future selves are time-consistent, i.e.
˜ β = 1, she is said to be completely naive. On the other hand, an agent is sophisticated if the self
in every period a correctly knows her future selves’ present-bias β and anticipates their behavior
when making her period-a decision.
2.1 Strategies, Payoﬀs and Equilibrium
We restrict our attention to Markov strategies and deﬁne a feasible strategy for a period-a self
as a mapping σa : Sa × R3 → D,w h e r eσa(sa,²a) ∈ {0,1,2} is simply the choice of the agent’s
period-a self over welfare, work or home when her state variables are sa and the period-a shock
vector is ²a =( ²0a,² 1a,² 2a). With slight abuse of notation, we write Ra (σa (sa,²a);sa,²a)a st h e
instantaneous period-a utility the agent obtains from strategy σa when the state is sa and shocks
are ²a.
8A strategy proﬁle for all selves is σ ≡ {σt}
A
t=a0 . It speciﬁes for each self her action in all




t=a as the continuation strategy proﬁle from period a to A. To deﬁne and characterize the
equilibrium of the intrapersonal game of an agent with potentially time-inconsistent preferences, we
ﬁrst introduce a useful concept: write Va (sa,²a;σ+
a ) as the agent’s period-a expected continuation
utility when the state variable is sa and the shock vector is ²a under her long-run time preference
for a given a continuation strategy proﬁle σ+
a . We can think of Va (sa,²a;σ+
a )a sr e p r e s e n t i n g
(hypothetically) her intertemporal preferences from some prior perspective when her own present-
bias is irrelevant. Speciﬁcally, Va (sa,²a;σ+






= RA (σA (sA,²A);sA,²A)+δE[W (sA+1)|sA,σA (sA,²A)], (7)
where W (sA+1) is the continuation value at the terminal age A a saf u n c t i o no ft h ep e r i o d - ( A+1)
state variables; and the expectation is taken over the fertility shock conditional on sA, as modelled
















where the expectation is taken over both the conditional fertility shock and ²a+1.
We will deﬁne the equilibrium for partially naive agents whose period-a self believes that,
beginning next period, her future selves will behave optimally with a present-bias factor of ˜ β ∈ [β,1].
Following O’Donoghue and Rabin’s (1999b), we ﬁrst deﬁne the concept of an agent’s perceived
continuation strategy proﬁle by her future selves.
Deﬁnition 2. The perceived continuation strategy proﬁle by a partially naive agent is a strategy
proﬁle ˜ σ ≡{˜ σa}
A
a=a0 such that for all a ∈ {a0,...,A},a l lsa ∈ Sa, and all ²a ∈ R3,
˜ σa (sa,²a)=a r gm a x
d∈D
n










That is, if an agent is partially naive with perceived present-bias by future selves at ˜ β, then her
period-a self will anticipate that her future selves will follow strategies ˜ σ+
a+1 ≡ {˜ σt}
A
t=a+1 . Given
this perception, the period-a self’s best response is called perception-perfect strategy proﬁle.
14In the empirical implementation, we approximate the continuation value by the following function of state vari-
ables:
W (sA+1)=ω1nA+1 + ω2n
2
A+1 + ω3xA+1 + ω4x
2
A+1 + ω5I(dA =1 )+ω6I(dA =2 ).




a=a0 such that, for all a ∈ {a0,...,A},a l lsa ∈ Sa, and all ²a ∈ R3,
σ∗













When the agent is sophisticated, i.e., when ˜ β = β, we immediately have ˜ σ = σ∗. Thus the
perception-perfect strategy proﬁle is simply the familiar subgame perfect equilibrium of the intrap-







˜ β = β
´
.
2.2 Numerical Solution of σ∗
In our empirical implementation, the terminal age A is ﬁnite. This allows us to numerically
solve the perception-perfect strategy proﬁle σ∗ recursively. The solutions for sophisticated, and
completely naive agents are merely special cases of the partially naive solution, so we describe how
σ∗ can be numerically solved for a partially naive agent.
First consider the terminal period A. For any sA ∈ SA, and ²A ∈ R3, the period-A self’s optimal
strategy is simple:
σ∗
A (sA,²a)=a r gm a x
d∈D
{RA (d;sA,² da)+βδE[W (sA+1)|sA,d]}.
A partially naive agent at period-(A − 1), however, would perceive her period-A self would follow
˜ σA (sA,²A)=a r gm a x
d∈D
n
RA (d;sA,² da)+˜ βδE[W (sA+1)|sA,d]
o
.
Now for every a = A − 1,...,a0, every sa ∈ Sa, and every ²a ∈ R3, we will have, recursively,
˜ σa(sa,²a) = argmax
d∈D
n























where Va+1 (·,·;·)i sr e c u r s i v e l yd e ﬁned by (7) and (8). This completes the recursion.
Informally, in equilibrium the individual’s decision making proceeds as follows. Beginning at
age a0, the period-a0 self observes her state variable sa0 a n dt h e nd r a w st h r e ec h o i c e - s p e c i ﬁcs h o c k s
²a0 ∈ N(0,Ω). Given the anticipated behavior of her future selves, represented in the above
recursive procedure by ˜ σ+
a0+1, she calculates the realized current rewards and the expected future
rewards from each of her three alternatives, using her own discount factors (β,δ). This calculation
yields σ∗
a0 (sa0,²a0), representing the alternative that oﬀers the highest discounted present value.
Then the state variable is updated for period-(a0 + 1) according to the alternative chosen and the
process is repeated. The perception-perfect strategy at each age a,f o re a c hsa ∈ Sa, is identiﬁed by
10the region in the three dimensional space of ²a over which each of the alternatives is optimal, for the
given state sa. Since there is no closed-form representation of this solution, we will, in the estimation
and simulations below, solve the game numerically by backward recursion using crude Monte Carlo











The solution to the intrapersonal game described above provides the inputs for estimating the
parameters of the model by the following method. We ﬁrst describe the structure of our data (see
also Section 4). We have data on choices, state variables and related outcomes (such as welfare
beneﬁt levels and accepted wages) from a sample of agents each of whom solves the intrapersonal
conﬂict game. In what follows, we use superscript i ∈ {1,...,N} to index the agents. Our data









0 denotes the age at which individual i gave birth to her ﬁrst child (which
is the time she becomes part of our analysis) and Ai is the age at which we last observe the agent;







; (3) if agent i chooses to work, we observe her







with the understanding that wi
a = ∅ if di
a 6=1 .
We also have a separate data set that provides the welfare beneﬁt levels for families of diﬀerent
sizes for all the States, denoted by Gj where j indexes the State. We denote our data set by D.
The decision at any age a is deterministic for the agent for a given vector (sa,²a) ∈ Sa×R3,b u t
it is probabilistic from our perspective since we do not observe the shock vector ²a. As we described
in the last paragraph of Subsection 2.2, for a given parameters of the model Θ, we can numerically
solve for the perception-perfect strategy proﬁle as the solution to the game, and it then provides
the probability of choosing alterative di
a at state si
a;a n di fdi
























15The numerical solution method we employ follows closely Keane and Wolpin (1994). However, because the state
space of our model is, conditional on type, relatively small (roughly 150,000 elements at age A =3 4 ) ,w ed on o t
use Keane and Wolpin’s method for approximating the expected continuation values using only a subset of the state
s p a c e .I n s t e a dw ea p p r o x i m a t et h ee x p e c t e dc o n t i n u a t i o nv a l u ef o revery element of the state space by Monte Carlo
integration. Based on sensitivity analysis we chose to rely on 150 draws from the ² distribution to perform this
integration.
11To ease the computational burden, we take two shortcuts before maximizing the sample likeli-
hood. First, the parameters θj≡(θ0j,θ1j) in the welfare beneﬁts function Gj (·)[ s e eE q .( 3 ) ]a r e
taken as the mean of estimated real beneﬁt function in the agent’s State of residence j over the
period observed.16 Table A2 of the Appendix presents these estimated parameters, and summary
statistics for the 20 U.S. States represented in the sample.
Second, we estimate the parameters γ ≡(γ0,γ1,γ2,γ3,γ4) of the fertility function ρ(a,na,d a)
[See Eq. (6)] separately by estimating a logit.
Given this set of estimated parameters, the remaining parameters of the model, including those
in the utility function, the returns functions, and the variance-covariance matrix of the shocks Ω,


















˜ Θ,ˆ θj, ˆ γ
´i
. (9)







˜ Θ,ˆ θj, ˆ γ
´i
is a three-dimensional integral which we approx-
imate using 300 Monte Carlo draws to form kernel-smoothed simulators of the probabilities.18
3.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity
The likelihood function in (9) applies to a sample that is homogenous except for the following
observable initial conditions at the birth of the ﬁrst child: age ai
0,e d u c a t i o ngi




previous period choice di
ai
0−1 and the State of residence ji. The skills and preferences of individuals
are likely to vary, however, in unobservable ways that are both persistent, and correlated with
observable initial conditions. For example, those with greater endowments of unobservable human
capital may be more likely to prolong schooling and postpone both childbirth and entry into the
workforce. Ignoring this persistent heterogeneity would generate inconsistent estimates of the
model’s parameters.
16We thank Ken Wolpin for providing us with these estimates. The State of residence is deﬁned as the State in
which the respondent resided at the birth of her ﬁrst child.
17To ease identiﬁcation and the computational burden we assume Cov(²0a,² 1a)=C o v( ²1a,² 2a)=0 . The remaining
elements of the variance-covariance matrix are estimated.
18We chose 300 draws after tests for sensitivity of the simulated probabilities and data ﬁt to changes in the number


































is the present value of choosing alternative d at period
a;a n dτ is the smoothing parameter. In the estimation results that follow, τ is set to 150, again based on sensitivity
analysis. For related application of kernel smooother, see Eckstein and Wolpin (1999).
12To allow for the possibility of persistent heterogeneity correlated with initial conditions, we
p o s i tt h a ta g e n t sc a nb eo fK possible types, indexed by k ∈ {1,...,K};a n da l l o wd i ﬀerent types
of agents to diﬀer in their home production skill endowment e0, unobservable labor market skill
endowment h0, welfare stigma φ, and non-welfare home production decay parameter η. In our




0 and η(k) for each
k ∈ {1,...,K} respectively.19
The ex ante probability that an agent i is of type k is denoted by Pi
k. To capture correlation
between an agent’s unobservable type and her initial conditions, we allow Pi
k to depend on all of her
observable initial conditions except State of residence in the form of a multinomial logit.20 That

































































































































. Now write ˜ Θk as the set of model parameters for type-k agent to be

























˜ Θk,ˆ θj, ˆ γ
´i
. (10)
3.2 Identiﬁcation of β and δ
We now address the separate identiﬁcation of the present-bias factor β and the standard discount
factor δ. In some models, it has been shown that the decisions of sophisticated present-biased agents
are observationally equivalent to those of time-consistent exponential discounters, and identiﬁcation
19In our estimation, we choose K = 3 after sensitivity analysis.
20We omit State of residence because the variation in welfare beneﬁts in the data provides an important source
of identiﬁcation for the model’s parameters. Allowing type to depend on State of residence would sharply weaken
our ability to identify, in particular, unobserved home production and welfare stigma parameters from variation in
decisions correlated with variation in initial conditions, welfare beneﬁts and wages.
13of the two parameters is thus ap r i o r iprecluded. For example, Barro (1999) demonstrates the
observational equivalence in a growth model with sophisticated agents, perfect credit markets, and
log utility. The equivalence does not hold more generally. Harris and Laibson (2001) show, for
example, that observational equivalence is not obtained when the assumption of perfect credit
markets is relaxed. This illustrates that, as is true in any structural empirical paper, the ability
to separately identify β and δ results from both the structures imposed by the model and the
variations in the data. In what follows, we hope to provide identiﬁcation arguments from three
diﬀerent angles.
Qualitative Diﬀerences in the Behavioral Eﬀects of Changes in β and δ. We ﬁrst argue
that changes in β (while holding δ constant) will have a qualitatively diﬀerent eﬀect on welfare versus
work decisions than similar changes in δ (while holding β constant). Speciﬁcally, in a companion
paper (Fang and Silverman 2004a), we show in a deterministic setting that, if stigma φ lasts for
only one period after switching into welfare (as it does here), then: greater short-term patience
(a higher β)w i l ll e a dt omore welfare participation, while greater long-term patience (a higher δ)
will lead to less welfare participation. Consider the following deterministic three-period numerical
example. Suppose that net wages are a deterministic increasing function of work experience x given
by w(0) = −1.5,w(1) = −1.0a n dw(2) = 4.5; and the welfare beneﬁts are constant at 2, but the
one shot stigma is φ =4 . Thus, the net welfare beneﬁts as a function of welfare experience κ is
given by b(0) = −2,b(1) = b(2) = 2. Table 1 shows the discounted payoﬀst ow o r kv e r s u sw e l f a r e
from the perspective of the ﬁr s tp e r i o ds e l ff o rd i ﬀerent values of β and δ. When β =0 .80 and




and the discounted payoﬀ from welfare is b(0)+β
2 P
κ=1
δκb(κ)=0 .96. Given the increasing proﬁles,
it follows that in equilibrium the agent chooses work in all three periods. An increase in the long
term patience δ from 0.95 to 1.0 (while keeping the short term patience β ﬁxed at 0.8) merely
serves to widen the gap between the returns to work versus welfare. If we think of these payoﬀsa s
expectations, the increase in long-term patience serves to increase the probability the agent works.
On the other hand, if we increase the short term patience β to 0.90 (while keeping the long term
patience ﬁxed at δ =0 .95), the discounted payoﬀ from welfare now exceeds that from work. That
i s ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h es h o r tt e r mp a t i e n c el e a d st h ea g e n tt oc h o o s ew e l f a r ei na l lt h r e ep e r i o d s .
[Table 1 About Here]
Intuition for these countervailing eﬀects of increased short-term versus long-term patience comes
from consideration of a single mother who was living at home in the previous period. For such
14a decision-maker, the costs of welfare stigma, and the loss of special home production loom large
but the gains from enduring the stigma today will be realized in large measure beginning next
period. For present-biased agents, this one-time stigma and their taste for immediate gratiﬁcation
may induce a delay in welfare take-up — a delay that the same agent would not choose if she
were time-consistent. The greater the degree of short term-impatience, the more likely she is to
delay the welfare take-up decision. Holding the present-bias factor constant, however, increases in
long-term patience will disproportionately aﬀect the incentives to work that derive only from the
returns to experience obtained in the relatively distant future. These same increases in long-term
patience may, however, leave the relatively immediate trade-oﬀs between home and welfare little
changed. As a result, greater long-term patience will decrease the likelihood of choosing welfare in
the expected way. Thus, we would expect that changes in β could aﬀect the conditional probability
of choosing welfare in the opposite way from similar changes in δ, and thus reveal through the
structure of the model, rates of time discount in the near versus the long term.
[Table 2 About Here]
In Table 2, we summarize the results of a series of simulation experiments suggesting that this
intuition from the deterministic case carries through and that the countervailing eﬀects of β and
δ hold locally. Panel 1 of Table 2 considers the simulated decisions of individuals at various levels
of the discount factor δ, holding the present-bias factor (and all other parameters ﬁxed).21 As
δ increases, the fraction of individuals choosing welfare declines monotonically. When δ =0 .84,
agents on average choose welfare 47.7 percent of the time. Increasing the standard discount factor
one standard deviation to δ =0 .86 leads to a small decline in average welfare participation to 46.9
percent. As we continue to increase δ, average welfare participation continues to decline ending at
40.3 percent participation when agents have a standard discount factor of 0.92.
Panel 2 performs the parallel exercise for variations in β, holding δ ﬁxed. Here the results
diﬀer qualitatively. Following the intuition provided above, greater short-term patience increases
the probability of choosing welfare. When β =0 .20, agents choose welfare on average 43.8 percent
of the time. When β =0 .41 this fraction increases to 46.5 percent, and when β rises by another
standard deviation, average participation increases to 47.2 percent. Similarly, we ﬁnd that the
simulated eﬀects of changes in β and δ may diﬀer qualitatively for the same individual depending
on her age.
21Except for β and δ, all other parameters are set to their estimated levels for sophisticated present-biased model
agents (see Tables 5 and 6).
15Formal Arguments for Distinguishing Exponential and Hyperbolic Discounting in a
Simpler Model. In another related paper (Fang and Silverman 2004b), we studied the non-
parametric distinction of exponential and hyperbolic discounting models of welfare program par-
ticipation. The model there is more complicated in allowing for bias in predicting future cost of
working, but is simpler in only allowing for stochastic component in the utility from work, but not
from home or welfare. In that model, we show that if we have three or more periods of observations,
then a present bias model with β ∈ (0,1),δ ∈ (0,1) can be distinguished from exponential discount-
ing model with β = 1 and δ ∈ (0,1) using standard data without making parametric assumptions
on the distribution of stochastic shock in the payoﬀ from working (see Proposition 2). While the
arguments used in the proof do not generalize to the case when we allow for stochastic components
in all three choices, this result informs us that, (β,δ)-discounting per se does not create problems in
identiﬁcation in this context. Finally, note that, while it is true that our model in this paper allows
for stochastic shocks in all three choices, we have, as is standard, imposed a parametric functional
form on their joint distribution. In this sense, we have modelled a setting where identiﬁcation is
easier than that considered in Fang and Silverman (2004b).
Likelihood Surface. In practice, whether the two discount parameters are separately identiﬁed
with reasonable precision depends on the curvature of the likelihood surface as we vary β and δ. As
an illustration, Figure 1 presents the three-dimensional surface of the log-likelihood as a function
of β and δ when other parameters are set at their respective estimates. It is particularly worth
noting that when β is 1, the log likelihood is substantially lower than its global maximum.
[Figure 1 About Here]
The above three arguments do not, of course, provide a deﬁnitive statement about the identiﬁ-
cation of the highly non-linear model we estimate in this paper. Taken together with the reasonably
small standard errors presented below, however, they do suggest that the theoretical bases for iden-
tiﬁcation suggested in our companion papers may be valid in this more realistic model. We believe
that the considerable amount of variations in wages and welfare beneﬁts across agents, States and
time in the data, together with our assumption of a one-period welfare stigma in the model [see
Eq. (4)], indeed provide a ﬁeld data analogue of the lab experiments in which subjects reveal their
rates of time discount in both the near and the longer term.
164D a t a
4.1 Sample Deﬁnition
The data are taken from the 1979 youth cohort of the National Longitudinal Surveys of Labor
Market Experience (NLSY). The NLSY began in 1979 with 6,283 women ages 14-22, and has
interviewed this cohort annually up to 1994, and biannually since 1994. We restrict attention to
the 675 women who, as of their interview in 1992, had both remained unmarried and given birth
to at least one child during the years they were surveyed. We then consider only the decisions each
individual made after the birth of her ﬁrst child and during the calendar years 1978-1991, assuming
she continued to reside in the State in which she lived at the birth of her ﬁrst child.
Our purpose in selecting this subsample of individuals and years is threefold. First, to be
consistent with our model, we want to restrict attention to those who, if they do not work, are
almost certainly eligible for welfare by virtue of having a child and being unmarried. Second,
to better justify our assumption that marriage decisions are not germane, we restrict attention to
women who never marry. Third, we want to limit our analysis to decisions made before the changes
in welfare eligibility rules beginning in 1993, and easily anticipated by 1992. Finally, again to ease
the computational burden, we further limit our sample to residents of the 20 States best represented
in the data. This ﬁnal restriction leaves us with 483 individuals taken from the NLSY’s core random
sample and its oversamples of blacks and Hispanics. The women in our subsample were observed
with at least one child for an average of 9.3 of the 14 years from 1978-1991, providing us with
4,487 state-choice observations for the estimation. Note, however, our sample selection criterion
also suggests caution in generalizing the estimates in this paper to the overall population.
4.2 Period and Variable Deﬁnition
At each interview, the NLSY collects welfare participation data as a monthly event history
recorded back to the preceding interview. The survey’s employment data are collected as a weekly
event history. We assume the decision period of the model corresponds to a calendar year, and
identify an agent as age a in a year if she was a years old for at least half that year. The decisions
at each age a are deﬁned as follows: An individual chose welfare at age a if she received Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) for at least six months of the year during which she
was a years old. An individual chose work at age a if she was employed for at least 1,500 hours of
t h ey e a rd u r i n gw h i c hs h ew a sa years old. An agent chose to stay home if she chose neither of the
17above.22,23
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics of the subsample are presented, by age, in Table A1 of Appendix A. Since
none of the women in the subsample marries during the period she is observed, the group we study
is not typical of the general US population. To better understand the ways in which members of the
subsample diﬀer from the average population, Table A1 also compares their statistics with those of
the entire sample of women in the NLSY from 1978-1991. Broadly, this comparison suggests that
while the subsample represents the targets of the U.S. welfare policy, it is atypical of the population
as a whole.
[Table 3 About Here]
The distribution of choices among welfare, work, and home is presented by age in Table 3.
We concentrate on the decisions made at ages 16-32, that represent 98 percent of the data. The
fraction of the subsample choosing welfare increases considerably between ages 16 and 22. Of the
16 year-olds with at least one child, 32 percent chose welfare while 54 percent of 22 year-olds with
children chose welfare. The proportion choosing work exhibits a comparable increase over the same
p e r i o d :r i s i n gf r o mz e r op e r c e n to f1 6y e a r - o l d sw i t hc h i l d r e nt o1 7p e r c e n to f2 2y e a r - o l d s .G i v e n
these changes in welfare and work participation we, by deﬁnition, observe a more dramatic decline
in the fraction of women with children choosing to remain at home; with 68 percent choosing to
stay home at age 16 and just 29 percent choosing to stay at home at age 22.
W h i l et h e s eb a s i ct r e n d sc o n t i n u ef o rt h ef r a c t i o n sc h o o s i n gw o r ka n dh o m eb e y o n da g e2 2 ,t h e
fraction choosing welfare stops increasing and instead exhibits a slow decline after age 22. By age
25, 47 percent of the sample is now choosing welfare, despite having on average more children. By
age 29, the fraction is 43 percent.
Not all of the movements in these age-decision proﬁles reﬂect the changing choices of the same
individuals. The observed transitions are partly due to the fact that the composition of the sample
is changing as the women of the NLSY age and, by virtue of having a child, join the subsample. To
investigate the degree to which the choices of same individuals change over time, Table 4 presents
the one-period transition rates between decisions by the same agent. Here we see evidence of
22On 19 occasions a respondent reported that she both received AFDC for at least 6 months of the previous calendar
year and worked more than 1,500 hours that year. In these cases the agent was deﬁned as having chosen welfare.
23In about 9% of our observations, the respondent was attending school. This part of the sample is concentrated
among agents younger than 18. These observations are also concentrated in the sample we classify as “choosing
home,” among which 15.7% was attending school.
18considerable persistence in individuals’ choices. The rows of Table 4 represent the choices made in
period t − 1; the columns describe the choices made in period t.T h et o pﬁgure (Row %) in each
cell represents the fraction of the subsample that made the row choice in period t − 1w h ow e n t
on to make the column choice in period t. The bottom ﬁgure (Column %) in each cell shows the
fraction of the subsample that made the column choice in period t who made the row choice in the
previous period. We ﬁnd that 84.3% of those who chose welfare in period t − 1w e n to nt oc h o o s e
i ta g a i ni np e r i o dt. Conversely, of those who chose welfare in period t, 76.7% had chosen welfare
in the previous period. Of those who chose work in period t −1, 7 9 . 3 %w e n to nt oc h o o s ei ta g a i n
in period t. Decisions to remain at home are considerably less persistent. Of those who chose to
stay home in period t − 1, 59.7% chose it again in period t.
[Table 4 About Here]
5R e s u l t s
5.1 Estimates of Welfare Beneﬁt Function Gj and Fertility Function ρ
Table A2 in Appendix A presents the parameters of the beneﬁtr u l ef o rt h et w e n t ys e l e c t e d
States used in our estimation. As has been often noted, there is considerable variation in beneﬁts
levels across States. In our sample, the estimated average annual beneﬁt for a mother with two
children ranges from $4,856 (1987 dollars) to $9,490. Patterns of welfare participation vary with
the level of beneﬁts in ways consistent with optimizing behavior. In our sample, 56 percent of the
residents in the 5 States with the highest beneﬁts received welfare, while 37 percent of these in the
5 States with the lowest beneﬁts were on welfare.
Table A3 in Appendix A presents the parameter estimate of the fertility function (6). These
parameter estimates suggest that the probability of an additional birth is decreasing with age and
with the number of children. The estimate also indicates that, relative to those who stay home,
the probability of an additional birth is lower for workers and higher for those on welfare. We note,
however, that our simple exogenous model of subsequent fertility beyond the ﬁrst child explains
very little of the variation in the timing of births in this subsample. The pseudo-R2 is less than
two percent.
5.2 Parameter Estimates
In our estimation, we assume that agents are of three possible types, i.e., K =3 . Tables 5
and 6 present the parameter estimates under three diﬀerent restrictions of the model. Column
(1) presents estimates when we restrict agents to be time-consistent, that is, restricting β =1 ;
19Column (2) presents estimates when agents are assumed to be sophisticated and present-biased





. We present both the point estimates and their asymptotic standard
errors.24
[Tables 5-6 About Here]
In the sophisticated present-bias model, the estimated present-bias factor β equals 0.33802 with
a reasonably small standard error of 0.06943. A Wald test would also reject the hypotheses of time-
consistency (t-statistic 9.53 against the null of β = 1), indicating that β is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 1. Allowing for present-bias improves the data ﬁt in a statistically signiﬁcant way, and a
likelihood ratio test easily rejects the time-consistent model (the χ2 statistic for the likelihood ratio
test is over 32). This provides evidence that the behavior of the single mothers are aﬀected by
present bias. However, the likelihood ratio test does not yield overwhelming evidence in favor of
the completely naive or sophisticated model.25 Note that both imposed a particular restrictions
on ˜ β. This also indicates that a completely unrestricted model (i.e., ˜ β is also a parameter to
be estimated) is probably not identiﬁe d . I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,w ew i l lf o c u so nt h er e s u l t sf r o mt h e
sophisticated present-biased agent model.26
Combined with the estimated standard discount factor δ =0 .87507, our estimate of the present-
bias factor implies a one-year ahead discount rate of 238%. Our estimate of the present-bias factor is
low relative to most of those estimated in experimental studies, though more similar to Paserman’s
(2002) structural estimate for low wage workers. Inferential studies such as Hausman (1979),
and Warner and Pleeter (2001) estimate discount rates ranging from 0 to 89% depending on the
characteristics of the individual and intertemporal trade-oﬀsa ts t a k e .P a s e r m a nﬁnds, for low-wage
workers a discount rate of about 149%. Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman’s (2004) point estimates
of β and δ are respectively 0.7031 (with standard error of 0.1093) and 0.9580 (with standard error of
0.0068), which imply a one-year ahead discount rate of 48.5%. There are two possible explanations
for the diﬀerence between our ﬁnding and others. First, the samples cover diﬀerent subpopulations.
Our sample includes mostly poor, never-married women with children (see Table A1). Thus it is
24Asymptotic standard errors are estimated using the BHHH, or outer product of gradients, method. See Berndt,
et al (1974).
25Technically we can not use likelihood ratio test to distinguish completely naive and sophisticated present biased
models because they are not nested: the completely naive model restricts ˜ β =1 , a n dt h es o p h i s t i c a t e dm o d e lr e s t r i c t s
˜ β = β.
26The results for naive present-biased agents are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. The key simulation results
are included for completeness in Appendix B.
20possible that this subpopulation is more susceptible to present-biases. Second, diﬀerent papers
focus on diﬀerent spheres on decision making. It is very possible that the magnitudes of present
bias diﬀer by speciﬁcd e c i s i o n s .
Besides the discount factors, Tables 5 and 6 also present estimates, by (unobservable) type, the
net welfare stigma, home production functions, wage functions, continuation value functions, and
variance-covariance matrix of the shocks, etc. Of particular interest is the substantial estimated
return to experience in the wage oﬀer function, and the considerable variation in the estimated
skills and tastes across types. There is an important average gain in wages for every year of addi-
tional work experience. The unobservable skill levels that determine those wages vary importantly,
however, by type.
5.3 Within-sample ﬁt
Age-Choice Proﬁles. Summarizing the interaction of the potentially complex and countervailing
eﬀects of time preferences and basic incentives, Figures 2-4 compare the estimated model’s predicted
distributions over the three alternatives welfare, work and home, to the actual distributions in the
data, by age. The model’s predictions represent the simulated decisions of 1,000 agents in each of
16 cells deﬁned to reﬂect the sample variation in initial conditions j,a0,g 0,x a0, and da0−1. There are
four diﬀerent j categories deﬁned as high, medium-high, medium-low, and low beneﬁts municipality.
Similarly there are four g0 categories deﬁned as 10 years of schooling or less, 11 years of schooling,
12 years of schooling, and some college at the birth of the ﬁr s tc h i l d . W i t h i ne a c ho ft h e s e1 6
cells, the initial conditions are given by the sample average (beneﬁt s ,a g e ,s c h o o l i n g ,e x p e r i e n c e )
level in the cell. These sample averages imply probabilities of the agent being of the three diﬀerent
unobservable types. The distribution of the 1,000 simulated decisions in each of these cells is then
weighted by the probability of each type and the proportion of the data falling into that initial
condition cell to generate the predicted distributions appearing in Figures 2-4.
[Figures 2-4 About Here]
T h es i m u l a t e da g ep r o ﬁles match the data quite well. Each of the proﬁles implied by the
estimated model assumes approximately the correct shape, and mostly matches the levels of the
data quite closely. More formally, Table A4 of the appendix presents the within-sample χ2 goodness
of ﬁt statistics for the model with respect to the choice distribution, by age. These statistics conﬁrm
the impression given by Figures 2-4.
Transition Probabilities. Table 7 presents the simulated one-period transition probabilities for
the sophisticated present-biased agent model. This table is to be compared with the transition
21probability matrix in the data (see Table 4). The model matches the persistence and relative rates
of transition quite well. To illustrate, the estimated model predicts that 84.4% of those who chose
welfare in period t − 1 will go on to choose it again the following period while 11.4% will choose
to stay at home. These ﬁg u r e ss h o u l db ec o m p a r e dw i t h8 4 .3% and 12.3% observed in the data.
Similarly the model predicts that 57.0% of those choosing home in period t−1 will remain at home
next period, while 25.9% will switch to welfare, comparable to 59.7% and 28.3% respectively in the
data.
[Table 7 About Here]
Wage Proﬁles. Figures 5 and 6 compare, respectively, the model’s mean wage-age and wage-
experience proﬁles, with the parallel moments in the data. Save the outlying wages of age-18
workers, the model somewhat underestimates of average wages for those who choose to work (see
Figure 5). Overall, however, the average accepted wages, by age, of the model and data are quite
similar. Save the accepted wages of those with no experience, the model slightly underestimates
wage levels while replicating the observed shape of the wage-experience proﬁle (see Figure 6).
[Figures 5-6 About Here]
5.4 Out-of-Sample Fit
As we mentioned in Subsection 4.1, we have used only residents of the 20 States best repre-
sented in the NLSY in our empirical estimation. The sample of single mothers from the remaining
States allow us to examine the out-of-sample ﬁt of our model and the estimates. Figure 7 com-
pares the proportions of single mothers choosing welfare, work and home by age predicted by our
present-biased sophisticated model using the parameter estimates in Section 5.2 with their data
counterparts. The model is able to capture the relative shape of changes in the participation rates
as the women get older. For example, the model’s prediction of the increase in the proportion of
working single mothers mirrors that in the data. However, our model consistently overestimates
the proportion of single mothers on welfare and underestimates the proportion at home.
[Figure 7 About Here]
6 Numerical Simulations
The estimates and simulations presented in Subsection 5.2 indicate that the work-welfare-
h o m ed e c i s i o n so fn e v e r - m a r r i e dw o m e nw i t hc h i l d r e nc a nb ew e l ld e s c r i b e db yam o d e lo ft i m e -
inconsistent preferences. With a reasonable degree of precision, the estimated model indicates
22ap r e s e n t - b i a sf a c t o r( β) substantially less than unity; and the model matches many aspects of
observed decision and accepted wage proﬁles. But as we have said earlier, we could not clearly dis-
tinguish sophisticated and naive present-biased models - both models are able to ﬁtt h ed a t am u c h
better than a time-consistent model. In this section, we present simulation results for sophisticated
present-biased agents. Analogous results for completely naive present-biased agents are included
in Appendix B.
On its own, an estimated β less than one does not imply that time-inconsistency importantly
inﬂuences the work-welfare decisions of never-married women with children. It may be that the abil-
ity to commit to future decisions inﬂuences behavior in statistically identiﬁable, but economically
insubstantial, ways. This possibility is particularly relevant for the model estimated here. In our
model, initial conditions such as welfare beneﬁts in State of residence, and years of schooling, and
unobservable skills diﬀer across individuals; and these diﬀerences would be expected to importantly
inﬂuence decision making. While time-inconsistency in preferences may aﬀect marginal decisions,
it may be that the inﬂuence of initial conditions typically places individuals far from these margins,
and the ability to commit would have little eﬀect on decisions. By extension, if most individuals
are little inﬂuenced by their inability to commit to future decisions, the behavioral and utility
consequences of policies such as time limits or workfare that may serve as commitment devices
will not much depend on the time-inconsistency of their targets.27 In the next sections we use the
estimated parameters of the sophisticated present-biased model to quantify both the behavioral
and utility consequences of the ability to commit, and consider how diﬀerent policy reforms aﬀect
both behavior and utility in the presence of time-inconsistency.
6.1 Consequences of an Ability to Commit
To evaluate the consequences of an ability to commit to future decisions, we use the estimated
parameters of the sophisticated present-biased model to simulate the decisions of agents with various
initial conditions both with and without commitment ability. In this experiment, an individual has
commitment ability if, starting from the period in which her ﬁrst child is born, her future selves
behave as though they were time-consistent (i.e. β =1 ) ,a n db e l i e v e da l lo ft h e i rf u t u r es e l v e sa l s o
to be time-consistent. Equilibrium behavior represents the optimal plan of an individual considering
t h es e q u e n c eo fd e c i s i o n st ob e g i na tt h eb i r t ho fh e rﬁrst child.
Evaluating utility eﬀects in a setting with time-inconsistency is often thought to be especially
problematic because sequences of utility ﬂows may be valued diﬀerently by the diﬀerent selves of
27See Fang and Silverman (2004a) for a discussion of how time-limits could serve as commitment mechanisms.
23the same individual.28 I nt h el i t e r a t u r eo nt i m e - i n c o n s i s t e n c y ,t w oc r i t e r i ah a v eb e e np r o p o s e d
to serve as a basis for comparing an agent’s well being: the Pareto criterion (Laibson 1997) and
the long-run utility criterion (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999a). The Pareto criterion asks if all the
s e l v e sa r em a d eb e t t e ro ﬀ; while the long-run utility criterion takes the perspective of an eﬀectively
time-consistent agent just prior to the decision-making sequence, and asks if she is made better
oﬀ. From the perspective of policy evaluation, it is not obvious which of these criteria is the
more appropriate. Based on its similarity to prior utility evaluations in structural estimation (see,
e.g., Keane and Wolpin 1997), we adopt the latter criterion for estimating changes in well-being.
Speciﬁcally, we calculate the discounted stream of expected lifetime utility for period-a0 self, i.e.,
t h es e l fw h e nh e rﬁrst child was born if, counterfactually, β =1 . Explicitly, we ﬁrst numerically solve
for the perception-perfect strategy proﬁle, denoted by σc∗ ≡ {σc∗
a }
A
a0 for an agent with β =1a n d
δ = ˆ δ =0 .875, the point estimate presented in Table 5. Of course, σc∗ depends on agents’ initial
conditions at period a0. Conditional on an agent’s initial conditions, her utility with commitment





As a benchmark for comparison, when agents do not have ability to commit, we also numerically
solve for the perception-perfect strategy proﬁle, denoted by σn∗ ≡ {σn∗
a }
A
a0 for an agent with
β = ˆ β =0 .338 and δ = ˆ δ =0 .875. Conditional on an agent’s initial conditions, the utility without






Note that Un is not how period-a0 self would have evaluated the lifetime utility with her (β,δ)
preference. We reported below (Uc − Un)/Un as the percentage change in lifetime utility as a
result of the ability to commit. Representative results of the simulations are presented, by initial
conditions cell, in Table 8. The cells (1-8) vary according to the level of the beneﬁts in the State
of residence, age and years of schooling at ﬁrst birth, and thus probability of being types 1 and
2. The levels of these initial conditions are presented in second panel in Table 8. The same initial
conditions (by cell) are used in subsequent tables.
[Table 8 About Here]
28As Caplin and Leahy (2000) points out, models of time-consistent discounting also exhibit this feature. Suppose,
at the birth of her ﬁrst child, a time-consistent decision maker rationally chooses a career of welfare rather than work
because the short-term costs of work exceed the discounted long-term gains. Ten years later she would regard the
streams of utility coming from work versus welfare very diﬀerently; she would strictly prefer that she had worked for
the previous 10 years.
24Panel 1 of Table 8 indicates that while the behavioral eﬀects of an inability to commit may
be large, they diﬀer both in size and sign depending on initial conditions. For example, among
individuals in cell 2, who were relatively young and little educated at the birth of their ﬁrst child, and
who live in a high beneﬁts State, work is relatively unattractive and commitment ability leads them
to work somewhat less (2.74%) of the time between ages 18 and 34. For this group, the inability
to commit generated costly delay, not in work, but in the takeup of welfare. With commitment
ability, they are quicker to endure welfare stigma in exchange for the future beneﬁto fw e l f a r e
receipt. Compare this eﬀe c to fc o m m i t m e n tt ot h a to fs i m i l a r l yy o u n ga n db u tb e t t e re d u c a t e d
individuals in a low beneﬁts State (cell 3). In this second group, for whom working is relatively more
attractive, the ability to commit leads them to work an additional 23.32% of the time, representing
a 66 percent increase in their probability of working. Comparing across other cells, we observe
similar disparities in the behavioral reaction depending on the relative attractiveness of welfare
and work. Among the more educated, and those living in lower welfare beneﬁts States, the ability
to commit leads to signiﬁcantly more work; among those with less education and living in high
beneﬁts States commitment generates either little, or negative changes in work behavior.
Importantly, the results of Table 8 also indicate that while the behavioral changes produced by
an ability to commit may be large, the utility eﬀects are invariably modest. The change in lifetime
utility as a result of commitment ranges from $1737 (a 5.03 percent increase) for those in cell 7
with the highest levels of education and medium welfare beneﬁts, to $1525 (a 5.33 percent increase)
for those in cell 5 with medium levels of education and low welfare beneﬁts, and to $1092 (a 2.37
percent increase) for among those in cell 1 with very low levels of education and welfare beneﬁts.
It may seem puzzling that the behavioral eﬀects of commitment could be large while the utility
gains among the same group are relatively small. This result derives from two mechanisms. First,
for those delaying welfare takeup in favor of home, the delay in the absence of commitment is fairly
short — typically less than two years. Thus the cumulative gains are relatively modest. Second, for
those delaying entry into the labor force, the delay is typically longer, but the gains are realized
only in the relatively distant future. So while it may be optimal from the perspective of the period
a0 self to commit herself to a career of work, the gains from that decision (relative to the decisions
made in the absence of commitment) will be realized only after substantial work experience has
accumulated, and will thus discounted by time. The costs required in order to acquire that work
experience are, on the other hand, realized in the relatively near term, and thus discounted less
by time. As a result, from the perspective of the period a0 self, the net gains from commitment
may be relatively small even when the behavioral consequences are substantial. If, however, we
evaluate the change in utility from the perspective of the agent in her late 20s, the utility gains
25from commitment can be as high as 11 percent of continuation utility.
6.2 Consequences of Time Limits
The experiment of the previous section sets an upper bound on the utility gains from commit-
ment. While we know that imperfect commitment devices such as time limits and workfare can at
most deliver some fraction of these gains, it is not clear how they would inﬂuence work decisions.
Table 9 presents the results of simulation exercises when we impose welfare eligibility time limits
of varying lengths. Again we consider the behavioral and utility consequences for individuals with
diﬀerent initial conditions.
[Table 9 About Here]
While each of the time limits increases the frequency of work, in doing so they almost always
reduce the lifetime utility of individuals in the model. Regardless of the limit’s length, the predicted
increases in work and decreases in utility are most dramatic for those with little education living
in high beneﬁts States (see, e.g., cells 2 and 4). The model implies that time limits are too
crude a commitment device. They fail to induce more work while increasing expected lifetime
utility. Though, for those living in low beneﬁts States, and for those with higher levels of skills
and education, the utility losses from the actual ﬁve-year time limit are quite modest (see cells 1,
3, 5 and 7). Thus, in these lower beneﬁts States, the model suggests that if the policy goal is to
promote work while limiting the utility consequences to the welfare eligible, a ﬁve-year time limit
is a reasonable tool. In higher beneﬁt sS t a t e sa n da m o n gt h o s ew i t hl o wh u m a nc a p i t a l ,h o w e v e r ,
the estimated utility consequences are relatively severe.
From the perspective of the period a0 self, the preferred length of the time limit depends
somewhat on education level and type. Among those with less education (cell 3), longer limits
induce less work but generate more utility. Among those with more education (cells 5, 7, and 8)
the longest limit is most preferred, but among the shorter limits, the shorter the better. Indeed,
among these groups, eliminating welfare is preferred to a year-long time limit; and in particular,
cell 5 and 7 groups may strictly prefer the elimination of the welfare system.
6.3 Consequences of Workfare
Table 10 presents the results of a parallel analysis with workfare policies. In these experiments,
two dimensions of the policy are varied: (1) the degree to which workfare contributes to human
capital, and (2) the extent to which workfare compensates for lost home production.
[Table 10A b o u tH e r e ]
26Policy version 1 assumes that workfare is merely “make work” — participation in the program
adds nothing to human capital. In this version of the policy, home production is compensated by
50% while on workfare through, for example, a child care subsidy. (With each policy the stigma
of welfare participation is assumed to apply.) Policy version 2 assumes workfare approximates
market work — participation in workfare contributes to work experience just as labor market work
would.29 Again home production is compensated by 50%. Last, policy version 3 replicates the
human capital structure of policy version 2, but increases home production compensation to 75%.
For the ﬁrst version of the workfare policy, in which the work requirement adds nothing to
human capital while reducing home production by half, the model predicts substantial increases
in market work. Among those with less schooling, the increases in time spent in the labor market
are somewhat larger for those in low beneﬁt States (see, cells 1 and 3). Among those with more
schooling, the opposite holds: make-work policies lead to the largest increases in market work for
those living in higher beneﬁt States (see cells 6 and 8). Regardless of education or welfare beneﬁts
level, however, this ﬁrst workfare policy reduces expected lifetime utility, though for those with
greater human capital living in low beneﬁts States, the declines are quite modest.
The predicted eﬀects of workfare can be qualitatively diﬀerent, however, when the work required
adds to human capital (policy versions 2 and 3). When workfare provides the opportunity to
accumulate human capital, there are two countervailing eﬀects on decision making. On one hand,
the access to human capital at a guaranteed “wage” makes welfare a relatively attractive choice. On
the other hand, the accumulation of human capital while receiving welfare will make a transition
into market work more appealing. The simulations indicate that the dominating eﬀect vary with
the initial conditions of the agents. Relative to the “make-work” policy, the second version of the
policy leads to greater increases in market work among welfare-eligibles with relatively low human
c a p i t a li nh i g hb e n e ﬁt States (cells 2, 4 and 6). For those with higher human capital, and/or living
in low beneﬁts States (cells 1, 3, 5, 7 and 8) are the employment gains smaller with this second
policy.
When home production is compensated by half (policy version 2), the utility eﬀects of the policy
experiment are somewhat mixed. Among those with more human capital living in low beneﬁts
States, the commitment eﬀect of the policy combined with the ability to accumulate human capital
while on welfare leads to modest increases in expected lifetime utility. But those with relatively low
human capital living in high welfare beneﬁt States (cells 2 4 and 6), lifetime expected utility declines,
though the declines are quite modest. When home production is compensated by 75% (policy
version 3), the model predicts, more uniformly, lifetime utility gains. These gains are arguably
29The decay of human capital still occurs when an individual leaves market work for workfare.
27modest, but mostly derive from increases in employment of a size comparable to those derived
from make-work workfare. Thus, these simulations indicate that sizeable increases in employment
among the welfare eligible can be achieved at relatively low utility cost (or indeed with utility gains)
from workfare that both generates marketable human capital and substantially compensates for
lost home production.30
7 Conclusions
Estimates of the structural parameters of a dynamic model of labor supply indicate that the
work-welfare-home decisions of never-married women with children are well described by a model
of time-inconsistent preferences. With reasonable precision, we estimate a present-bias factor (β)
less than unity; and the model matches many aspects of observed decision and wage proﬁles. We
reject a model of standard discounting at standard levels of conﬁdence.
Simulation exercises using the model’s estimated parameters indicate that while the behavioral
consequences of an inability to commit to future decisions may be substantial, by one measure
the utility consequences of the self-control problem are modest. The model suggests that the
ability to commit to future decisions would often lead to considerably more work and less welfare
participation. However, for those with low levels of human capital, and living in high welfare beneﬁts
States, procrastination leads to costly delays in welfare takeup. For this group, commitment ability
leads to slightly more, not less, welfare participation. Moreover, among those entering the labor
force earlier, this entry involves costs in terms of welfare beneﬁts and home production forgone; and
the beneﬁts in terms of higher wages are accrued only in the relatively distant future. As a result,
the discounted lifetime utility gains from commitment may be small even when the behavioral
consequences are large.
Further simulations of the model indicate that behavioral and utility consequences of welfare
reform policies that serve as imperfect commitment devices vary according to both the character-
istics of the intended targets and the design of the policy. Simulations suggest that time limits are
too crude to enhance expected utility. While limits serve to substantially increase employment,
they do so at a sometimes substantial utility cost for the welfare-eligible. For those living in low
beneﬁts States, and for those with higher levels of skills and education, however, the utility losses
from a ﬁve-year time limit are quite modest. The estimated model indicates that workfare policies
also better serve those with more education living in States with lower welfare beneﬁts. However,
when workfare leads to the accumulation of valuable human capital, and includes compensation
30The gains would be more subtantial if, as is plausible, the policy also reduced the stigma of welfare participation.
28for lost home production through, for example, child care subsidies, the estimated model suggests
that most potential recipients will increase both their employment and their lifetime utility.
We interpret these results as qualiﬁed support for the extension of standard models of dynamic
labor supply to allow for time-inconsistency. Our ﬁndings with this model indicate that allowing
for time-inconsistency may be both feasible and fruitful, adding to our understanding of the po-
tential consequences of policy. We also view our ﬁndings as a caution against simple arguments
for accounting for the role of psychological biases in public policy. As our simulations indicate,
even when individuals display substantial present-bias in preferences, simple policies that resemble
commitment devices may not function eﬀectively as such.
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0.80 0.95 0.99 0.96
0.80 1.00 1.30 1.20
0.90 0.95 1.30 1.33
Table 1: Qualitative Diﬀerences in Behavioral Eﬀects of Changes in β and δ
Panel 1: Average Percent of Time Observed Choosing Welfare with β =0 .34
δ =0 .84 δ =0 .86 δ =0 .88 δ =0 .90 δ =0 .92
47.73 46.92 45.62 43.61 40.27
Panel 2: Average Percent of Time Observed Choosing Welfare with δ =0 .88
β =0 .20 β =0 .27 β =0 .34 β =0 .41 β =0 .48
43.38 44.74 45.62 46.46 47.23
Table 2: Simulated Decisions for Varying Levels of the Discount Parameters, Ages 18-32.
32Welfare Work Home Total
Age Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number
16 31.9 15 0.0 0 68.1 32 100.0 47
17 38.2 34 0.0 0 61.8 55 100.0 89
18 38.5 60 1.9 3 59.6 93 100.0 156
19 46.6 109 8.6 20 44.9 105 100.0 234
20 50.2 143 11.9 34 37.9 108 100.0 285
21 50.5 165 14.1 46 35.5 116 100.0 327
22 53.7 188 16.9 59 29.4 103 100.0 350
23 51.2 191 20.6 77 28.2 105 100.0 373
24 48.5 182 25.6 96 25.9 97 100.0 375
25 47.3 187 27.1 107 25.6 101 100.0 395
26 48.6 196 30.5 123 20.8 84 100.0 403
27 44.3 167 32.1 121 23.6 89 100.0 377
28 45.1 142 33.0 104 21.9 69 100.0 315
29 42.8 109 37.7 96 19.6 50 100.0 255
30 47.9 91 35.3 67 16.8 32 100.0 190
31 43.1 62 39.6 57 17.4 25 100.0 144
32 35.6 32 42.2 38 22.2 20 100.0 90
Total 47.1 2073 23.8 1048 29.1 1284 100.0 4405
Table 3: Choice Distribution, Ages 16-32, Never-married Women with at Least One Child.
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Parameters Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Preference Parameters
Discount Factors β 1n . a . 0.33802 0.06943 0.355 0.0983
δ 0.41488 0.07693 0.87507 0.01603 0.868 0.02471
Net Stigma φ(1) 7537.04 774.81 8126.19 834.011 8277.46 950.77
(by type) φ(2) 10100.9 1064.83 10242.01 955.878 10350.20 1185.27
φ(3) 13333.2 1640.18 12697.25 1426.40 12533.69 1685.92
Home Production e
(1)
0 2684.97 427.85 2209.48 405.26 2224.98 456.85
(by type) e
(2)
0 3324.79 516.96 3502.66 509.07 3492.15 617.64
e
(3)
0 1729.53 1418.21 2126.86 879.54 2182.17 1227.66
e1 84.83 441.45 124.92 48.95 121.58 130.57
e2 -36.21 105.61 -603.29 215.67 -608.39 560.31
η(1) 2484.69 494.09 4565.06 399.07 4588.88 756.19
η(2) 4432.11 573.40 6547.94 503.62 6557.07 933.40
η(3) 9858.23 1290.18 12149.5 869.089 12054.63 1670.74
Wage and Skill Parameters
Constant h
(1)
0 0.12881 0.09963 0.16329 0.0676 0.1672 0.1362
(by type) h
(2)
0 0.59176 0.10073 0.6121 0.06828 0.61628 0.13625
h
(3)
0 1.11547 0.12045 1.10907 0.08089 1.12299 0.14646
years of schooling α1 0.01995 0.0082 0.02153 0.00501 0.02166 0.00976
experience α2 0.13513 0.01056 0.12252 0.00853 0.12142 0.01203
experience2 α3 -0.00736 0.0009 -0.00623 0.00068 -0.00605 0.00099
1st year experience α4 0.09352 0.04291 0.06681 0.02949 0.06742 0.04535
experience decay α5 -0.22702 0.03601 -0.23105 0.03096 -0.23694 0.03731







Parameters Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Continuation Value Function at Age 35
num. of children ω1 794.52 743350.2 2618.55 3511.39 2496.75 197163.19
num. of children2 ω2 -8938.74 82101.40 -8918.7 5258.05 -8638.95 27929.24
experience ω3 62.74 20429.20 235.24 268.94 231.11 4500.37
experience2 ω4 -54.47 516.04 378.36 115.00 374.21 185.64
welfare lag ω5 2617.59 7515.73 8707.61 6322.23 8725.00 10638.20
work lag ω6 1544.06 13820.09 6151.05 4142.20 6260.41 14140.67
Log Odds as Function of Initial Conditions for Types 2 and 3
Type 2: constant π
(2)
0 -1.842 1.544 -1.070 1.550 -1.179 1.593
age π
(2)
1 0.0067 0.087 -0.0406 0.086 -0.0385 0.0867
yrs. of schooling π
(2)
2 0.129 0.124 0.133 0.122 0.139 0.127
experience π
(2)
3 0.217 0.194 0.227 0.190 0.221 0.187
welfare lag π
(2)
4 0.0865 0.662 0.398 0.618 0.406 0.633
work lag π
(2)
5 0.0131 0.578 0.062 0.587 0.0576 0.578
Type 3: constant π
(3)
0 -3.948 2.423 -5.627 2.328 -5.562 2.273
age π
(3)
1 -0.687 0.126 -0.360 0.168 -0.356 0.167
yrs. of schooling π
(3)
2 1.303 0.156 0.9322 0.268 0.918 0.263
experience π
(3)
3 0.1055 0.2811 0.314 0.278 0.318 0.277
welfare lag π
(3)
4 -0.526 1.252 -0.640 1.508 -0.463 1.305
work lag π
(3)
5 0.575 0.881 -0.13387 0.874 -0.144 0.846
Variance and Covariance of Shocks
std. dev. of ²0 σ²0 5262.40 548.55 5656.61 446.56 5708.50 579.19
std. dev. of ²1 σ²1 0.3751 0.0122 0.3726 0.0071 0.3707 0.0076
std. dev. of ²2 σ²2 4168.06 334.76 4116.96 331.49 4074.99 459.82
cov(²0,² 2) σ2
²0²2 -3046.77 168.32 -2849.19 202.06 -2861.02 247.60
Log-likelihood -3505.96 -3489.80 -3486.44
χ2-Statistics 32.32 n.a. 6.72
Table 6: Parameter Estimates for Time Consistent, Sophisticated and Naive Present Agents (con-
tinued from Table 5). Note: χ2 statistics are calculated under the null hypothesis of the present-
biased sophisticated model.
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Table 7: Simulated Transition Probability Matrix for Sohpisticated Present-Biased Agents.
Initial Conditions Cell
12345678
Panel 1: Simulated Effects
changes in % working 14.07 -2.74 23.32 -3.38 24.44 -1.71 24.69 13.07
% change in lifetime utility 3.41 2.42 4.78 2.37 5.33 2.47 5.03 3.26
Panel 2: Initial Conditions For Different Cells
wel. beneﬁts (1 child) 4126.53 7103.51 4103.53 7278.74 4073.25 7116.39 4278.39 7023.98
wel. beneﬁts (2 children) 5383.13 8781.58 5340.66 8969.49 5315.70 8809.24 5529.23 8746.56
age at ﬁrst birth 17 18 19 19 21 20 22 22
years of schooling 9 9 11 11 12 12 14 14
work yr. befor ﬁrst birth No No No No Yes No No Yes
yrs of work exper. at ﬁrst birth 00001011
Prob (type = 1) 0.622 0.636 0.556 0.556 0.469 0.513 0.335 0.339
prob (type = 2) 0.356 0.349 0.383 0.383 0.454 0.387 0.383 0.412
Table 8: Simulated Eﬀects of the Ability to Commit for Sophisticated Present-Biased Agents, by
Initial Conditions.
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Figure 7: Age-Decision Proﬁl e :C o m p a r i s o no fO u t - o f - S a m p l eD a t aa n dS i m u l a t i o nw i t hE s t i m a t e d
Parameters (Sophisticated Agents).
41A Appendix: Additional Tables and Estimates
Descriptive Statistics of the Selected Women and All Women Table A1 compares the
statistics of our selected subsample (never married women with at least one child) with those of the
entire sample of women in the NLSY. It shows that the subsample has on average more children at
every age. By age 32, the gap is relatively small with the subsample having on average 2.1 children,
and the entire sample 1.6. At every age the subsample has an average of 1.25 fewer years of work
experience, and 2.01 more years of AFDC receipt; and at every age older than 19, full-time workers
in the subsample earn on average $1,456 less than their counterparts in the entire sample. On
average, the subsample has also completed fewer years of schooling (10.9) than the entire sample
(12.6).
Estimates of Welfare Beneﬁt Function Gj Table A2 presents the estimates of welfare beneﬁt
functions for the twenty States used in our estimation.
Fertility Function ρ Table A3 presents the estimates of the fertility function ρ.
Within-Sample Goodness of Fit Test Table A4 presents the χ2 goodness-of-ﬁtt e s to ft h e
within-sample choice distributions by age. The column labelled by “Row” is the χ2 statistic for
the overall choice distribution for the particular age in that row.
42Number of Children Yrs. of Work Experience Yrs. of Schooling∗ Earnings for Workers∗∗ Yrs. Received AFDC
Age All Women Our Sample All Women Our Sample All Women Our Sample All Women Our Sample All Women Our Sample
16 0.06 (0.01) 1.23 (0.08) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 9.38 (0.02) 8.81 (0.17) 5410.34 (617.97) n.a. 0.00 (0.00) 0.13 (0.06)
17 0.10 (0.01) 1.24 (0.06) 0.03 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 10.28 (0.02) 9.37 (0.14) 5808.70 (166.49) n.a. 0.01 (0.00) 0.24 (0.06)
18 0.17 (0.01) 1.28 (0.04) 0.10 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 11.14 (0.02) 10.04 (0.12) 7001.72 (167.58) 10822.56 (2254.07) 0.02 (0.00) 0.34 (0.06)
19 0.25 (0.01) 1.36 (0.04) 0.26 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 11.75 (0.02) 10.41 (0.10) 7723.65 (122.65) 6715.04 (766.20) 0.04 (0.00) 0.49 (0.06)
20 0.33 (0.01) 1.43 (0.04) 0.54 (0.01) 0.14 (0.03) 12.19 (0.02) 10.63 (0.09) 8301.49 (102.97) 7361.80 (623.75) 0.07 (0.01) 0.78 (0.07)
21 0.44 (0.01) 1.49 (0.04) 0.87 (0.02) 0.25 (0.03) 12.48 (0.02) 10.77 (0.09) 8819.52 (111.21) 7040.99 (594.02) 0.10 (0.01) 1.09 (0.08)
22 0.54 (0.01) 1.59 (0.05) 1.26 (0.02) 0.43 (0.05) 12.71 (0.03) 10.86 (0.08) 9676.16 (110.01) 8097.39 (505.02) 0.15 (0.01) 1.45 (0.09)
23 0.66 (0.01) 1.70 (0.05) 1.72 (0.03) 0.69 (0.07) 12.87 (0.03) 10.92 (0.08) 10405.64 (107.29) 8929.34 (374.76) 0.21 (0.01) 1.86 (0.10)
24 0.77 (0.01) 1.79 (0.05) 2.24 (0.03) 0.95 (0.08) 12.95 (0.03) 10.96 (0.09) 11086.97 (113.59) 9376.78 (394.42) 0.27 (0.01) 2.30 (0.12)
25 0.89 (0.02) 1.84 (0.05) 2.79 (0.03) 1.34 (0.10) 13.01 (0.03) 11.02 (0.09) 11719.11 (129.55) 9787.95 (411.93) 0.32 (0.02) 2.67 (0.13)
26 1.01 (0.02) 1.90 (0.05) 3.34 (0.04) 1.68 (0.12) 13.07 (0.03) 11.06 (0.09) 12280.13 (136.35) 10099.91 (381.09) 0.38 (0.02) 3.02 (0.14)
27 1.12 (0.02) 1.94 (0.05) 3.85 (0.04) 2.05 (0.14) 13.14 (0.03) 11.10 (0.09) 12674.95 (165.59) 10392.56 (393.77) 0.43 (0.02) 3.38 (0.16)
28 1.23 (0.02) 1.95 (0.06) 4.39 (0.05) 2.44 (0.17) 13.18 (0.04) 11.22 (0.10) 13379.60 (220.25) 10692.78 (448.43) 0.47 (0.02) 3.61 (0.19)
29 1.33 (0.02) 1.99 (0.07) 4.91 (0.06) 2.66 (0.21) 13.20 (0.04) 11.37 (0.11) 13651.76 (278.03) 11004.52 (497.69) 0.50 (0.03) 3.89 (0.23)
30 1.41 (0.02) 2.08 (0.08) 5.48 (0.08) 2.89 (0.26) 13.24 (0.04) 11.44 (0.13) 13531.17 (293.62) 11360.18 (632.93) 0.52 (0.03) 4.48 (0.29)
31 1.54 (0.03) 2.11 (0.10) 5.90 (0.10) 3.22 (0.32) 13.22 (0.05) 11.56 (0.15) 13614.89 (364.01) 13455.48 (1091.30) 0.55 (0.04) 4.67 (0.33)
32 1.63 (0.03) 2.08 (0.13) 6.40 (0.12) 3.99 (0.45) 13.24 (0.05) 11.70 (0.21) 14301.09 (827.82) 12091.61 (871.85) 0.58 (0.04) 4.49 (0.43)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Means are calculated using the NLSY’s 1979 sample weights. Members of te poor white and military oversamples excluded.
*: years of schooling at the birth of the ﬁrst child. **: earnings are full-time equivalent in 1987 dollars.







1 2380.45 1238.01 3618.46 4856.48 39.6
2 2467.68 1301.31 3768.99 5070.30 50.0
3 2962.66 1203.84 4166.50 5370.34 32.9
4 2979.62 1280.44 4260.06 5540.50 22.5
5 3128.33 1340.02 4468.35 5808.38 39.2
6 3493.63 1186.81 4680.45 5867.26 29.6
7 3541.08 1251.03 4792.11 6043.13 50.3
8 3985.20 1212.98 5198.18 6411.15 46.6
9 4348.62 1098.98 5447.60 6546.58 28.2
10 4358.47 1318.76 5677.23 6995.99 71.0
11 4279.58 1419.96 5699.54 7119.50 51.2
12 4509.59 1368.62 5878.21 7246.83 29.4
13 4183.05 1539.27 5722.32 7261.59 13.6
14 4592.94 1343.95 5936.89 7280.83 20.2
15 4511.30 1411.63 5922.93 7334.57 66.8
16 5005.98 1480.68 6486.65 7967.33 52.5
17 4988.00 1577.07 6565.07 8142.15 27.0
18 5634.63 1661.86 7296.49 8958.35 61.7
19 5317.42 1851.81 7169.23 9021.04 69.7
20 6264.03 1613.01 7877.04 9490.05 68.5
Mean 4146.61 1385.00 5531.62 6916.62 43.5
Std. Dev. 1042.30 187.46 1182.51 1334.38 17.9
*: States are left unnamed to maintain the anonyminity of survey respondents.
**: Percent of Sample living in the corresponding State that choose welfare
Table A2: Estimated Annual Welfare Beneﬁts Function, Summary Statistics (1987 dollars)










Table A3: Logit Estimates of the Fertility Function.
45Choice
Age Welfare Work Home Row
18 6.09∗ † 0.19 6.28∗
19 4.56∗ 0.79 2.05 7.40∗
20 7.82∗ 3.76 2.18 13.76∗
21 2.63 3.78 0.16 6.56∗
22 3.98∗ 4.19∗ 0.50 8.68∗
23 1.28 1.94 0.03 3.25
24 0.00 0.19 0.14 0.32
25 0.61 0.00 1.32 1.93
26 0.23 1.46 0.38 2.07
27 1.39 1.38 0.17 2.93
28 0.25 0.00 0.72 0.97
29 0.64 1.06 0.02 1.72
30 0.32 0.36 0.00 0.68
31 0.19 0.00 0.66 0.85
32 0.77 0.12 4.63∗ 5.52∗
∗ : Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
† : Fewer than 5 obervations.
Table A4: χ2 Goodness-of-Fit Tests of the Within-Sample Choice Distribution By Age, Model with
Sophisticated Agents.
46B Appendix: Simulation Results for Completely Naive Present-
Biased Agents
We present the simulation results for naive present-biased agents in this appendix.
Choice at t




























Table B5: Simulated Transition Probability Matrix for Naive Present-Biased Agents.
Initial Conditions Cell
1 2345678
changes in % working 9.41 -2.79 17.95 -3.07 22.58 -2.16 23.80 11.30
% change in lifetime utility 2.82 2.39 4.23 2.43 4.95 2.47 5.00 3.17
Table B6:Simulated Eﬀects of the Ability to Commit for Naive Present-Biased Agents, by Initial Conditions.
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Time Limits 1234567 8
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Table B8: Simulated Eﬀects of Workfare Policies for Naive Present-Biased agents, by Initial Conditions.